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Oluwole: Race Consciousness and Government Speech

ARTICLE
REVISITING PARENTS INVOLVED V.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT:
RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE
JOSEPH O. OLUWOLE*

INTRODUCTION
School districts have voluntarily adopted plans to address persistent
racial de facto segregation/re-segregation in education and to ensure that
students are exposed to a diverse student population reflective of the
American society. Despite the benefits these race-conscious plans seek,
there has been some legal and social opposition to the plans. It was such
opposition that led to the Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 1 case and several earlier cases. 2 The plans
have been challenged under the Equal Protection Clause and failed under
the strict-scrutiny standard of review. This is because, as constitutional

* Joseph O. Oluwole, Attorney-at-Law and Associate Professor of Education and Law at
Montclair State University. J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Ph.D., The
Pennsylvania State University. I would like to extend my deep gratitude to Natalie Lyons, Executive
Articles Editor, and Alexandra Vesalga, Editor-in-Chief, of Golden Gate University Law Review for
their invaluable help with this Article.
1
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1 (Parents Involved IV), 551 U.S.
701 (2007).
2
See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000); Tuttle v.
Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Hunter v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999); Ho by Ho v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir.
1998); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F.
Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000).
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law scholar Gerald Gunther has aptly noted, strict scrutiny is “strict in
theory and fatal in fact.” 3
This social and legal opposition has intimidated school districts into
pulling back efforts to implement race-conscious plans. 4 If this trend
continues, fewer and fewer students will have the opportunity to interact
with students of other races before they proceed to college and the larger
society. We need to provide our schools with the tools and discretion
necessary to ensure that students get educated in racially diverse settings.
The government-speech doctrine—a “recently minted” judicial
doctrine 5 —is empowering for schools seeking to promote such inclusive
education.
Professor William M. Carter, Jr.’s trailblazing work, Affirmative
Action As Government Speech, 6 first examined the relationship between
government speech and race-conscious measures. 7
According to
Professor Carter, the United States Supreme Court “has come to view
race-conscious government action as a form of prohibited government
speech.” 8 This Article takes a different approach from that of Professor
Carter; specifically, the Article reviews the majority, dissenting, and
concurring opinions in the Parents Involved case for language indicating
the Justices’ parameters for viewing voluntary race-conscious measures
as government speech. This is important, given that Parents Involved is
the landmark Supreme Court decision on race-conscious measures at the
K-12 school level.
The government-speech doctrine is particularly apropos when
schools desire to “achieve or maintain racial integration through the use
of race-conscious student assignment plans, under which the race of all
students is equally considered and all students receive a spot in the public
schools.” 9 In such cases, opposition has been mostly to the message the

3

Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
4
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1018 (D. Mass. 1996).
5
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 899, 904 (2010) (“The U.S. Supreme Court did not recognize government speech as a
constitutional law doctrine, however, until quite recently.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court
has provided very little guidance as to what constitutes government speech.”).
6
William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action As Government Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. 2
(2011).
7
See generally id. (discussing how the United States Supreme Court has come to view
affirmative action as government speech in its opinions).
8
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
9
Id. at 7.
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voluntary race-conscious measure sends rather than the measure itself. 10
Indeed, the very concept of race-consciousness is expressive, conveying
a message that race matters. Opposition is often based on the
“colorblind” view that tries to convey the opposite message: race does
not matter. As Professor Carter observed:
The strict colorblindness doctrine treats any remedial or diversifying
government race consciousness as constitutionally suspect because of its
message alone. The message of such government action is condemned
because it is counter to what the Court has found to be a more important
message. That message can be characterized in a variety of ways: liberal
individualism, postracialism, antipaternalism, or antibalkanization.11
The government-speech doctrine would effectively ensure that the
government is not in violation of “private parties’ First Amendment
rights when it prevents them from joining or altering what is really the
government’s own speech.” 12 In other words, the government-speech
doctrine would protect the government from liability when it promotes a
diverse elementary and secondary education. Under that premise, this
Article analyzes the individual opinions in Parents Involved to determine
whether the Justices would support race-conscious programs under the
government-speech doctrine.
Part I of this Article describes the government-speech doctrine. Part
II describes the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence (the traditional
weapon of choice for those challenging race-conscious measures, due to
the potency of the strict-scrutiny test). Part III presents the facts of the
Parents Involved case. Part IV examines the opinions of the United
States Supreme Court Justices in Parents Involved in light of the
The Article concludes that the
government-speech doctrine. 13
government-speech doctrine would provide schools needed leeway to
pursue race-conscious measures.

10

See id.
Id. at 30 (footnotes omitted).
12
Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88
B.U. L. REV. 587, 600 (2008).
13
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion, and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia
joined that opinion. Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 708 (2007). Justice Kennedy—the swing
vote in Parents Involved IV—concurred in the judgment and wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 782.
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, and
Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissent. Id. at 798, 803.
11
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I. WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE?
A. DEFINITION
Government speech simply means speech by a government entity. 14
Thus, government speech would encompass speech by school districts.
Professor Carter points out that race-conscious measures constitute
symbolic speech under the United States Supreme Court’s two-prong
test: 15 first, race-conscious measures are intended to “convey a
particularized message” 16 of diversity and inclusion; 17 and second, “in
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great that the message
would be understood.” 18 Legal scholar Charlotte Taylor describes
government speech as follows:
Government speech is a broad category that includes any government
action that communicates or subsidizes the communication of a
particular message. It encompasses activities from appropriating
taxpayer money to campaign for or against specific legislative
measures to deciding who gets access to public fora such as theatres
and broadcasting frequencies to offering a program of subsidies for
expression—for example, funding for the arts—that makes contentbased decisions among qualified applicants. The government can be
said to ‘speak’ when it pays for speech directly, when it provides

14

See Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 368 (2009)
(“Government then becomes one of a host of speakers competing in the marketplace of ideas. Our
notion of freedom of speech has not demanded that the government abstain from such a role, nor
have we required government to endorse all viewpoints equally as it sends its messages.”).
15
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether particular conduct
possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked
whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
16
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
17
See Carter, supra note 6, at 36-39.
18
Spence, 418 U.S. at 411; see Carter, supra note 6, at 39-41; Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint
Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 754 (2011) (“[B]urning a draft card to
express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% expression . . . .
Attempts to determine which element ‘predominates’ will therefore inevitably degenerate into
question-begging judgments about whether the activity should be protected. As it is with speech
activities, so it is with speech regulations—they are ‘100%’ expressive. If the government’s
expressive interests are to be recognized, then those interests are undoubtedly implicated fully in
every speech regulation the government passes.” (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)
(quoting John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975)).
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access to public property for the communication of a given message,
or when an elected official voices her opinion on a given issue. 19

Government speech serves several functions.
Professor Gia B. Lee, government speech

According to

may, for example, seek to inform the public of matters the government
deems relevant, to rally support for governmental policies and
practices, to encourage or deter certain behavior, or to communicate
shared values and perspectives. In doing so, a government seeks to
shape public awareness, influence public opinion, or secure popular
support. 20

Racial diversity, equity, and inclusion are values a school district could
seek to rally support for or communicate through government speech in
the form of race-conscious measures. Through such measures, a school
district performs the government-speech function of cultivating social
consciousness of the importance of racial unity and diversity to the
sustenance of our democratic republic.
The government-speech doctrine started with the “rather benign
idea that of course the government can speak to its public, its democratic
rulers. Indeed, the government must speak, and propose, and defend, and
inform in order for democracy to work.” 21 The government must speak
in order to fulfill democracy’s ideals of individual liberty and selfgovernment. 22 Moreover, without government speech, “the polity cannot
engage in the business of government, evaluate government policy, or
disagree and dissent.” 23
As recently as August 2010, retired United States Supreme Court
Justice Souter stated that the government-speech doctrine is currently at

19

Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1115,
1142-43 (2010).
20
Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983,
992 (2005). For further discussions of some benefits of government speech, see Blocher, supra note
18, at 750-51.
21
Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 809, 810
(2010); see also The Supreme Court 2008 Term, Government Speech, 123 HARV. L. REV. 232, 238
(2008) (“Government speech doctrine is justified at its core by the idea that, in order to function,
government must have the ability to express certain points of view, and it would be unable to do so
effectively if, for example, the Constitution required a government pro-democracy campaign to be
accompanied by a pro-fascism campaign.” (footnote omitted)).
22
Bezanson, supra note 21, at 812.
23
Id.
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an “adolescent stage of imprecision.” 24 Despite its novelty and
imprecision, the government-speech doctrine is here to stay. 25
When the government speaks, the government-speech doctrine
creates a strong defense to a plaintiff’s claim that the government has
engaged in viewpoint discrimination. 26 This disempowers plaintiffs who
claim a deterioration of First Amendment rights. After all, as Professors
Helen Norton and Danielle Keats Citron note, “Political accountability
mechanisms such as voting and lobbying then provide the sole recourse
for those displeased by their government’s expressive choices.” 27 Yet if
used prudently, as in the case of race-conscious measures designed to
enhance diversity of public education, the government-speech doctrine
might be a powerful force for democratic values like tolerance, equality,
and acceptance.
B. JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE
The origins of the government-speech doctrine can be traced to Rust
v. Sullivan. 28 The doctrine was obscure in Rust, as the term “government
speech” was never used in the case; 29 however, the United States
Supreme Court has since noted Rust as the origin of the doctrine. 30
Rust involved a First Amendment challenge to federal regulations
precluding Title X fund recipients from performing abortion-related
activities. 31 The petitioners argued that the regulations violated the Free
Speech Clause because they barred “all discussion about abortion as a
lawful option—including counseling, referral, and the provision of
neutral and accurate information about ending a pregnancy—while

24

Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53, 54, 59 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Page v. Lexington
Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, C.A. No. 3:06-249-CMC, 2007 WL 2123784, at *6 (D.S.C. 2007) (stating that
the government-speech doctrine is “relatively new and its limits remain imprecisely defined and
subject to some debate”).
25
Bezanson, supra note 21, at 809 (stating that the government-speech doctrine is “now a
largely uncontroversial rule that when the government is speaking, its expressive actions are immune
from First Amendment freedom of speech limits”).
26
Norton & Citron, supra note 5, at 901; see also id. at 901-02 (stating that the government
is not mandated to publicly disclose itself “as the source of a contested message to satisfy the
government speech defense to a First Amendment claim”).
27
Id. at 904.
28
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
29
See Norton & Citron, supra note 5, at 905 (“Nowhere in Rust does the term ‘government
speech’ appear.”).
30
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did
not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have
explained Rust on this understanding.”); see also Norton & Citron, supra note 5, at 904 & n.25.
31
Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-78.
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compelling the clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes
continuing a pregnancy to term.” 32 The Supreme Court disagreed, noting
that there was “no question” about the constitutionality of the
regulations. 33 The Court reasoned that the government can promote or
favor certain values; and therefore the “government may make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.” 34
In an early articulation of the government-speech doctrine, the
Supreme Court declared:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion
of the other. A legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe the right. 35

To illustrate this point, the Court pointed out that, if Congress chooses to
fund a program like the National Endowment for Democracy to promote
democracy in other countries, the Constitution does not require Congress
to also fund programs supporting competing political philosophies such
as fascism and communism. 36 Accordingly, if a school district supports
race-conscious measures designed to promote diversity, it is not required
to support measures to oppose diversity.
The Supreme Court found that the government’s mere refusal to
fund or support a particular activity is not equivalent to the government
The Court distinguished between the
penalizing that activity. 37
government choosing to support an activity and government interfering
with a protected activity. 38 When government chooses to support one
activity over another, it is merely working within its operational
authority. 39 Further, the Rust Court ruled that the government has the
32

Id. at 192.
Id.
34
Id. at 192-93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)).
35
Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
36
Id. at 194 (“Petitioners’ assertions ultimately boil down to the position that if the
government chooses to subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize analogous counterpart rights.
But the Court has soundly rejected that proposition.” (emphasis added)).
37
Id. at 193.
38
Id.
39
See id. at 179, 193-94.
33
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authority to “define the limits” of programs it decides to support with
public funds. 40
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 41
the Supreme Court expounded on the government-speech doctrine by
giving the government power to make content-based decisions. In that
case, the Court found that denial of university funding for a student
organization’s newspaper costs is not synonymous with government
speech. 42 The Court declared:
[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices.
When the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when
it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own
message. . . . When the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes. When the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
43
distorted by the grantee.

The Supreme Court in Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth upheld the university’s student activity
fee but found the government-speech doctrine inapplicable because the
case did not involve speech by the University. In so holding, the Court
described the government-speech doctrine as effectively empowering the
government when it speaks. 44 Specifically, the Court stated that in the
course of its constitutional obligations, the government will have to
implement policies and programs that its citizens will passionately
disagree with. 45 Further, the Court declared that, despite protests from
the citizenry, the government could choose to promote those policies and
programs “by taxes or other exactions.” 46 The Court emphasized the
inevitability that public funds will be expended on speech and other
advocacy in the course of the government’s duties. 47 The Court
indicated that even though the government-speech doctrine immunizes
40

Id. at 194.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
42
Id. at 841 (“In this case, ‘the government has not fostered or encouraged’ any mistaken
impression that the student newspapers speak for the University.”).
43
Id. at 833.
44
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221, 229-35 (2000).
45
Id. at 229.
46
Id.
47
Id.
41
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government action from First Amendment scrutiny, citizens are not
without recourse. 48 This recourse includes the election of government
officials who will support programs and policies with which the citizenry
agree. 49
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez 50 presented the Supreme Court
with another opportunity to speak about the government-speech doctrine.
The Court was faced with a First Amendment challenge to the
congressionally created Legal Services Corporation (LSC) fund. 51 This
program barred fund recipients from legal representation in any case
entailing a challenge to current welfare law. 52 Finding the restriction
unconstitutional, 53 the Court distinguished the legal representation—
private speech—from government speech:
[A]n LSC-funded attorney speaks on the behalf of the client in a claim
against the government for welfare benefits. The lawyer is not the
government’s speaker. The attorney defending the decision to deny
benefits will deliver the government’s message in the litigation. The
LSC lawyer, however, speaks on the behalf of his or her private,
indigent client. 54

The Court reaffirmed its support for the breadth of the governmentspeech doctrine by reiterating that when the government is the speaker, it
is authorized to make funding decisions that discriminate based on
viewpoint. 55
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 56 the Court provided the
greatest insight since Rust on the government-speech doctrine. 57
Johanns involved a First Amendment challenge to a government
campaign designed to encourage consumption and marketing of beef. 58
In that case, various beef producers challenged the use of a mandatory

48

Id. at 235.
Id.
50
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
51
Id. at 536.
52
Id. at 536-37; see id. at 537 (“As interpreted by the LSC and by the Government, the
restriction prevents an attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts with a federal
statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application is violative of the
United States Constitution.”).
53
Id. at 548-49.
54
Id. at 542.
55
Id. at 541.
56
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
57
See id. at 557 (“We have not heretofore considered the First Amendment consequences of
government-compelled subsidy of the government’s own speech.”).
58
Id. at 553.
49
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assessment to fund the campaign. 59 The Court was presented with the
question of whether the campaign constituted government speech, thus
immunizing the speech from First Amendment challenge. 60 The Court
found that the campaign constituted government speech and that the
government can compel financial support of its own speech. 61 In other
words, the Constitution does not bar the government from compelling
support of programs with which citizens disagree. 62 The Court declared
that it had “generally assumed, though not yet squarely held, that
compelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First
Amendment concerns.” 63 The Court pointed out that some government
programs, partially or entirely, constitute speech, 64 as is the case with
race-conscious measures.
The Johanns Court ruled that in order to constitute government
speech, the speech must be shown to be “effectively controlled” by the
government. 65 The Court revealed six factors critical to an assessment of
whether speech is indeed “effectively controlled” by the government: 66
whether the government established the speech “from beginning to end”;
whether the government “set out the overarching message” of the speech;
if the government left the development of some details of the message to
a non-government entity, whether members of that entity are answerable
to the government; whether the government had “final approval authority
over every word used”; whether the government reviewed the message
“both for substance and for wording”; and whether the government was
in attendance and participated in open meetings for the proposal’s or
program’s development. 67

59

Id. at 555.
Id. at 553.
61
Id. at 559-62.
62
Id. at 559.
63
Id. (emphasis added).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 560.
66
Id. at 560-61.
67
Id. This Article will refer to these factors as the Johanns index of control. Prior to
Johanns, several federal courts of appeals have applied a non-exclusive list of four factors to
determine if speech was private or government speech: the central purpose of the program in which
the speech in question occurs, the degree of editorial control exercised by the government or private
entities over the content of the speech, the identity of the literal speaker, and whether the government
or the private entity bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of the speech. See, e.g., Arizona
Life Coal. Inc., v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2002); Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000). Given the Supreme
Court’s introduction of the Johanns index of control, it is uncertain whether the pre-Johanns factors
will have as critical a weight as they did before Johanns.
60
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The Court ruled that if the government entity “sets the overall
message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech
doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources in developing specific messages.” 68 Additionally, the Court
stated that “[c]itizens may challenge compelled support of private
speech, but have no First Amendment right not to fund government
speech. And that is no less true when the funding is achieved through
targeted assessments devoted exclusively to the program to which the
assessed citizens object.” 69
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 70 was the “first case in
which the Court was unanimous in characterizing contested speech as the
government’s.” 71 In Summum, the issue before the Court was whether a
private group could compel a government entity to place a permanent
monument in a public park. 72 The group sought to erect a monument
featuring the Seven Aphorisms of Summum 73 alongside other donated
monuments, such as the Ten Commandments, that were already in the
park. 74 The Court held that permanent monuments in public parks were
government speech. 75
The Court stated that the Free Speech Clause governs private
speech, not government speech. 76 Consequently, the government is free
to control what it says and to “say what it wishes.” 77 The Court noted
that the government “has the right to speak for itself” 78 and is free to
“select the views that it wants to express.” 79 Citing Justice Scalia’s
opinion in a prior case, 80 the Court iterated that “[i]t is the very business

68

Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
Id.
70
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
71
Norton & Citron, supra note 5, at 913.
72
Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.
73
The Summum church believes that, while on Mount Sinai, Moses received the Seven
Aphorisms (the Seven Principles of Creation) before receiving the Ten Commandments. Id. at 465
n.1. However, Moses showed the Seven Aphorisms only to a few people, because of his belief that
the Israelites were not prepared for the Aphorisms. Id.
74
Id. at 464-65.
75
Id. at 464.
76
Id. at 467.
77
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
78
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)).
79
Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); Nat’l Endowment for Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
80
Finley, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Scalia stated:
69
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of government to favor and disfavor points of view.” 81 Otherwise, as the
Court explained, public debate and the government’s functioning would
be compromised:
If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public
funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of
great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private
sector, and the process of government as we know it radically
transformed. . . . A government entity may exercise this same
freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from private
sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled
message. 82

The Court made plain that “[t]o govern, government has to say
something, and a First Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced
contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘marketplace of
ideas’ would be out of the question.” 83 As in Southworth, the Court
emphasized that when the government speaks, this immunity from a First
Amendment challenge does not protect government officials from
electoral accountability. 84 Citizens who do not like the government’s
position may vote for different government representatives. 85 As the
Seventh Circuit later explicated, the “constraints on the government’s
choice of message are primarily electoral, not judicial.” 86

It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern
times, at least) innumerable subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to elect
those who run the government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.
And it makes not a bit of difference, insofar as either common sense or the Constitution is
concerned, whether these officials further their (and, in a democracy, our) favored point of
view by achieving it directly (having government-employed artists paint pictures, for
example, or government-employed doctors perform abortions); or by advocating it officially
(establishing an Office of Art Appreciation, for example, or an Office of Voluntary
Population Control); or by giving money to others who achieve or advocate it (funding
private art classes, for example, or Planned Parenthood). None of this has anything to do
with abridging anyone’s speech.
Id. (footnote omitted).
81
Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990)).
83
Id. at 468 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg.
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
84
Id. at 468-69.
85
Id.
86
Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Various lower courts have applied the government-speech
doctrine. 87 Professor Andy Olree notes that “in freedom of speech cases,
lower courts have accepted the Rust-inspired government-speech
doctrine and seem to be aware that when the government has a message
to send, such a message need not be viewpoint-neutral, and other
messages need not receive governmental support.” 88 For example, in
Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District, a public school teacher
challenged the school district’s use of school bulletin boards to
commemorate Gay and Lesbian Awareness month. 89 The teacher
disagreed with such commemoration and sought to post his responses to
the commemorative postings. 90 The issue before the Ninth Circuit was
“whether the First Amendment compels a public high school to share the
podium with a teacher with antagonistic and contrary views when the
school speaks to its own constituents on the subject of how students
should behave towards each other while in school.” 91 The court
characterized the bulletin boards as government speech, noting that this
is “an example of the government opening up its own mouth.” 92 The
court emphasized that the school exercised final authority over the
content of the bulletin boards. 93 Furthermore, the court declared that
“[s]imply because the government opens its mouth to speak does not
give every outside individual or group a First Amendment right to play
ventriloquist.” 94
The Downs court held that
when a public high school is the speaker, its control of its own speech
is not subject to the constraints of constitutional safeguards and forum
analysis, but instead is measured by practical considerations
applicable to any individual’s choice of how to convey oneself: among
other things, content, timing, and purpose. 95

87

See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 330 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Summum
makes it clear that when the government uses its discretion to select between the speech of third
parties for presentation through communication channels owned by the government and used for
government speech, this in itself may constitute an expressive act by the government that is
independent of the message of the third-party speech.”); Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 616-19 (5th
Cir. 2005) (finding state selection and use of textbooks is government speech).
88
Olree, supra note 14, at 379.
89
Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1005-08 (9th Cir. 2000).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1005.
92
Id. at 1012-13.
93
Id. at 1011-13.
94
Id. at 1013.
95
Id.
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The court ruled that a school district is free to “decide not only to talk
about gay and lesbian awareness and tolerance in general, but also to
advocate such tolerance if it so decides, and restrict the contrary speech
of one of its representatives.” 96 The court reasoned that citizens seeking
to convey a viewpoint contrary to the school district’s can speak at the
ballot box by electing new school board members. 97
The Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to apply the governmentspeech doctrine in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the
University of Missouri. 98 The Curators of the University of Missouri
implemented an underwriting program designed to fund the university’s
public radio station. 99 Federal law required that public radio stations
acknowledge on air any source of funding for their broadcasts. 100 Under
the funding program, a donor could get an enhanced acknowledgment in
a fifteen-second message drafted by the radio station’s staff or the
donor. 101 The Ku Klux Klan asked the radio station if it could
underwrite four segments of one of the station’s broadcasts, National
Public Radio’s “All Things Considered.” 102 The Ku Klux Klan proposed
that the following acknowledgement be read on air:
The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a White Christian organization,
standing up for rights and values of White Christian America since
1865. For more information[,] please contact the Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, at . . . . Let your voice be heard! 103

The radio station rejected the Ku Klux Klan’s request to underwrite its
program, prompting the Klan to file suit challenging the decision as a
violation of the First Amendment. 104
The court ruled that acknowledgments read on air constituted
government speech as the radio station had final authority and editorial
control over the contents. 105 The court held that when the government

96

Id. at 1014; see also id. at 1015 (“Were we to invoke the Constitution to protect Downs’s
ability to make his voice a part of the voice of the government entity he served, Downs would be
able to do to the government what the government could not do to Downs: compel it to embrace a
viewpoint.”).
97
Id. at 1016.
98
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
99
Id. at 1088.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1089.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1090.
105
Id. at 1093–94. Additionally, the court pointed out that the underwriting program’s central
purpose was not to support the views of the donors, but to “acknowledge any money, service, or
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conveys a message over which it has editorial control and final authority,
the message is government speech, even if private individuals or entities
are involved in the speech. 106
The Sixth Circuit has described the government-speech doctrine as
follows:
Government can certainly speak out on public issues supported by a
broad consensus, even though individuals have a First Amendment
right not to express agreement. For instance, government can
distribute pins that say “Register and Vote,” issue postage stamps
during World War II that say “Win the War,” and sell license plates
that say “Spay or Neuter your Pets.” Citizens clearly have the First
Amendment right to oppose such widely-accepted views, but that right
cannot conceivably require the government to distribute “Don’t Vote”
pins, to issue postage stamps in 1942 that say “Stop the War,” or to
sell license plates that say “Spaying or Neutering your Pet is
Cruel.” 107

The Fifth Circuit has specifically extended the government-speech
doctrine to public schools, noting that “the government, including its
educational institutions, has the discretion to promote policies and values
of its own choosing free from forum analysis or the viewpoint-neutrality
requirement.” 108 The court maintained that the government’s discretion
encompasses cases in which private messengers are used to convey the

other valuable consideration directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by the
station with respect to the broadcast of any matter.” Id. at 1093 (internal quotation marks and
ellipsis omitted).
106
Id. at 1094. This is very similar to the Tenth Circuit’s determination in Wells v. City and
County of Denver that “[w]hen the government speaks, either directly or through private
intermediaries, it is constitutionally entitled to make content-based choices, and to engage in
viewpoint-based funding decisions.” Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541
(2001)); see also Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, C.A. No. 3:06-249-CMC, 2007 WL
2123784, at *6 (D. S.C. 2007) (“It is, however, clear that the government may speak through third
parties and that such speech will be deemed government speech even though drafted and presented
by a third-party at least when: (1) the government determines an overarching message; and (2)
approves every word disseminated at its behest.” (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S.
550, 561 (2005)). The Tenth Circuit ruled that “[t]he First Amendment does prohibit the
suppression of unpopular speech because of its content, but it does not require the government to
serve as a speaker’s proxy or bodyguard in order to enhance the strength of the speaker’s message in
the marketplace of ideas.” Wells, 257 F.3d at 1149; see also Newton v. LePage, 789 F. Supp. 2d
172, 192 (D. Me. 2011) (“[T]he overwhelming weight of authority indicates that government speech
may say what it wishes regardless of viewpoint . . . .”).
107
ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 379 (6th Cir. 2006) (footnotes omitted).
108
Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
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government speech. 109 The United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina expanded on the Fifth Circuit’s government-speech
approach, stating that “[t]he underlying justification is that the
government has ‘exercise[d] editorial judgment in choosing among
private speakers to facilitate the government’s own message.’” 110
The above cases make clear that when the government speaks, it has
“rights that are in many ways coextensive with the rights that private
speakers enjoy under the First Amendment.” 111 Those rights include the
“government’s exclusion of unwelcomed speech in the time, place, and
space of government speech activity.” 112 Given that the government
already speaks on various “contested social and political issues,” 113 the
government should not shy away from speech that relies on raceconscious measures to encourage diversity in the public schools. After
all, “[e]ducation is widely understood to be a primary way in which
government inculcates values in its citizens.” 114 As Professor Carter
admonishes, “[t]he Court should not lightly disregard the judgment of
democratically accountable actors that race consciousness sometimes
remains necessary to overcome persistent racial inequality.” 115
When the government-speech doctrine is invoked, “private speakers
lose their First Amendment claim not because the Court views the
private speakers’ expressive claims as weak, but rather because the Court
views the government’s competing expressive interests as stronger.” 116
With the Court viewing the government’s interests as relatively stronger
than that of private speakers, the government has a unique and “valuable
opportunity to influence social meanings and affect norms of conduct” 117
through mechanisms such as public-school admissions policies. In fact,
since schools have a tutelary relation with students and a responsibility to
instill values in students, it is particularly critical that they be able to
express “viewpoints designed to affect the social milieu or to persuade
people to think and act differently.” 118
The government-speech doctrine is very potent because “[o]nce a
court determines that the government has adopted the speech as its own,

109

Id.
Page, 2007 WL 2123784, at *6 (quoting Chiras, 432 F.3d at 613).
111
Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech when the
Government Has Nothing To Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1268 (2010).
112
Bezanson, supra note 21, at 809.
113
Taylor, supra note 19, at 1121.
114
Id. at 1156.
115
Carter, supra note 6, at 8-9.
116
Gey, supra note 111, at 1262.
117
Taylor, supra note 19, at 1121.
118
Olree, supra note 14, at 367-68.
110
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then only one conclusion could follow from everything the Court has
said about the new doctrine of government speech: the government will
win, and the private speaker will lose.” 119 The government-speech
doctrine permits “what had previously been thought forbidden: the
burdening, even if not silencing, of private viewpoints because the
government disagrees with them.” 120 This potency of the governmentspeech doctrine will prove particularly helpful to schools seeking to
instill values and develop our children into responsible, tolerant citizens
so that schools do not become breeding grounds for viewpoint
litigation. 121
The government-speech doctrine is a powerful weapon for
defending race-conscious measures designed to further diversity in
schools. This is particularly so because the doctrine gives immunity and
thus judicial deference to the government when it speaks. Accordingly,
the doctrine may give schools an opening to establish race-conscious
measures that will withstand legal challenges. With this opportunity to
promote benign race-conscious positions, resegregation of public schools
may be reversed, and children might have ample opportunities for
education in diverse schools and classrooms. Further, the post-racial
society of which many have dreamed and advocated may yet be realized.
The Equal Protection Clause strict-scrutiny test has served as an
impediment to the realization of those dreams. The next Part describes
the framework courts have traditionally used to review challenges to
school districts’ race-conscious measures under the Equal Protection
Clause.
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE REVIEW FRAMEWORK
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its

119

Gey, supra note 111, at 1303. See generally Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe, When
Government Speaks: An Examination of the Evolving Government Speech Doctrine, 274 EDUC. L.
REP. 753 (2012).
120
Blocher, supra note 18, at 697; see also id. at 696 (“[P]ursuant to government speech
doctrine, the government may be able to restrict private expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content, so long as in so doing it is expressing its own viewpoint.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
121
Blocher gives a very incisive perspective on the potency of the government speech
doctrine: “[O]nce the government is speaking, speakers cannot assert any First Amendment claim to
stop it from doing so, nor do they have a First Amendment right to oppose the government’s speech
by whatever method they choose. Of course, private speakers remain free to agree or disagree with
the content of the government’s message. But they cannot express that disagreement in their
preferred way . . . .” Id. at 711.
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 122
Courts have
traditionally used a three-tier framework for reviewing Equal Protection
claims. The tiers are strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational
basis. 123 Government classifications of a group of people can trigger
strict scrutiny in either of two ways: if the classification infringes upon a
fundamental right, 124 or if the government discriminates against a
member of a suspect class. 125
Courts determine whether a right is “fundamental” by examining
whether it is implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. 126 Rights the Supreme Court has accorded fundamentalrights status include the rights to interstate travel, 127 procreation and
marriage, 128 vote in federal and state elections, 129 privacy, 130 and free
association. 131
To determine if a classification is suspect, a court examines the facts
of the case for the “traditional indicia of suspectness.” 132 The indicia

122

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
See JOSEPH OLUWOLE, THE SUPREME COURT AND WHISTLEBLOWERS: TEACHERS AND
OTHER PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 135-50 (2008) (discussing the history of the Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence).
124
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988); see also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
125
Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457; see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 658 (suspect classifications
involve “racial classifications, which have . . . been regarded as inherently ‘suspect’”); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.”).
126
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (“It is not the province
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing.
Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.”).
127
See, e.g., id. at 32 (“The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of
constitutional significance.”); Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904 n.4 (1986)
(“[R]egardless of the label we place on our analysis-right to migrate or equal protection-once we
find a burden on the right to migrate the standard of review is the same. Laws which burden that
right must be necessary to further a compelling state interest.”).
128
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385
(1978).
129
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Note that Sailors v. Bd.
of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), ruled that there is no fundamental right to vote in local elections. Id.
at 108-11.
130
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
131
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
132
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
123
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include whether the class is “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.” 133 To date, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized only three classes as
suspect: race, 134 alienage, 135 and national origin. 136
Under the strict-scrutiny test, the government bears the burden of
proof. 137 The test requires the government to prove that it has a
compelling reason for the classification 138 and that the classification is
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling reason. 139
Persons challenging government classifications seek strict scrutiny
because the “compelling” reason and “narrow tailoring” requirements are
very difficult to meet. 140 Even when the government shows that it has a
compelling reason for the classification, it might not be able to show that
the classification is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
reason. 141 Narrow-tailoring jurisprudence often concludes that there are
less restrictive means for achieving the compelling reasons than the
government’s chosen classification. 142 Moreover, when strict scrutiny
applies, courts presume the classification is unconstitutional, and the
government must overcome that presumption in order to prevail. 143

133

Id.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 214-16 (1995); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
135
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1984) (“As a general matter, a state law that
discriminates on the basis of alienage can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny.
In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least
restrictive means available.”); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
136
Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72; Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948).
137
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506
n.1 (2005) (“We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are
justified.”).
138
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 720; Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
139
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 720; Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
140
Brant K. Brown, Note, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews: Constitutional Standards & the
Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 VAND. L. REV. 653, 667 (2000) (“[W]hile rational
basis is, in practice, almost a standard of per se legality, strict scrutiny is difficult to overcome.”).
141
See, e.g., Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 726 (2007); Tuttle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
195 F.3d 698, 705-07 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
142
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989); Eisenberg v.
Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 131-32 (4th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d
790, 807 (1st Cir. 1998).
143
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“[R]acial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively
invalid and can be upheld only on extraordinary justification.”); Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 128-29.
134
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Government classifications that discriminate against quasi-suspect
classes attract the intermediate-scrutiny standard of review. 144 The name
of the standard comes from the fact that it is the intermediate level of
review between strict scrutiny and rational basis. 145 Government
classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny confront a presumption of
unconstitutionality, similar to that with strict scrutiny. 146 To overcome
this presumption, the intermediate-scrutiny test requires the government
to show that it has an important reason for the classification and that the
classification is substantially related to the important government
interest. 147 The Court has recognized only gender 148 and illegitimacy 149
as quasi-suspect classes. 150
The most lenient of the three standards of review for government
classifications is rational-basis review. 151 Rational-basis review is
“minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.”152
Classifications that qualify for rational basis are presumed constitutional,
with the burden on the plaintiff to prove otherwise. 153 The rational-basis
test requires the plaintiff to prove that the classification is not rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. 154

144

Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
Id.
146
See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (“We therefore hold that once a State posits
a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there
is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply
because its natural father has not married its mother.”); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“And though the intermediate scrutiny test we have applied may not
provide a very clear standard in all instances . . . our case law does reveal a strong presumption that
gender classifications are invalid.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
147
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Supreme Court has sometimes referred to
the intermediate-scrutiny test as a requirement that the government provide an “exceedingly
persuasive justification.” See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
148
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982); Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
149
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); see also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-538
(1973); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968).
150
Harvey v. Mich. Dep’t of Mgmt. & Budget, Bureau of Ret. Servs., 664 N.W.2d 767, 77273 (Mich. 2003) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has applied the intermediate scrutiny test only
to challenges involving quasi-suspect classes such as gender and illegitimacy.”); Stacey L. Sobel,
The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court To Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 489, 495 (2012) (“The Supreme Court reserved intermediate scrutiny for discrimination
on the bases of gender and illegitimacy.”).
151
See Comment, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws That Deny
Subsistence, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1547, 1548 (1984) (“Rationality scrutiny . . . is a much more
deferential standard of review under which a statute can easily pass constitutional muster.”).
152
Gunther, supra note 3, at 8.
153
Comment, supra note 151, at 1567.
154
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 40 (1973) (“A century of
Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application
145
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Given that race is a suspect classification, race-conscious measures
fall under strict scrutiny, presenting school districts seeking to promote
diversity with a very difficult and sometimes impossible standard of
review. 155 The Supreme Court has indicated that both beneficial and
invidious uses of race trigger strict scrutiny:
all governmental action based on race—a group classification long
recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure
that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed. These ideas have long been central to this Court’s
understanding of equal protection, and holding benign state and
federal racial classifications to different standards does not square
with them. A free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality should tolerate no retreat from the principle that
government may treat people differently because of their race only for
the most compelling reasons. Accordingly, we hold today that all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional
only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
156
governmental interests.

Given the Supreme Court’s equally stringent approach to benign use of
race, it is time to consider a new approach. Benign racial classifications
should be framed—and therefore, protected—as government speech.
To set the stage for the discussion of the analysis that could support
a government-speech approach to benign use of race in public schools,
the next Part presents a summary of the facts and procedural history of
Parents Involved.
III. SYNOPSIS OF THE JOURNEY OF THE PARENTS INVOLVED CASE TO THE
SUPREME COURT
In Parents Involved, the United States Supreme Court consolidated
two cases to consider whether public schools can voluntarily use raceconscious measures to assign students to schools. 157 In one of the

of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State’s system be shown to bear
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”)
155
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
156
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (internal quotation marks,
brackets, and citations omitted).
157
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 710-11 (2007).
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cases, 158 the plaintiff nonprofit Parents Involved in Community School
sued in federal district court to challenge Seattle School District No. 1’s
use of racial tiebreakers for student assignments to its high schools. 159
The Equal Protection Clause challenge was brought on behalf of “parents
of children who have been or may be denied assignment to their chosen
high school in the district because of their race.” 160
Seattle School District No. 1 considered an applicant’s race as well
as the impact on racial balance of a school’s racial demographics in
student assignments. 161 The racial tiebreaker categorized students into
one of two racial groups: white or nonwhite. 162 The district’s overall
racial demographics provided the baseline; 163 approximately fifty-nine
percent of the students in the district were nonwhite and forty-one
percent white. 164 If a school’s racial demographic varied ten percent
above or below this baseline, the school was deemed racially
imbalanced. 165 Specifically, “[i]f an oversubscribed school is not within
10 percentage points of the district’s overall white/nonwhite racial
balance, it is what the district calls ‘integration positive,’ and the district
employs a tiebreaker that selects for assignment students whose race will
serve to bring the school into balance.” 166 As the Supreme Court later
pointed out, unlike school districts under court-ordered desegregation,
Seattle’s plan was not a response to a history of district-sanctioned
segregation. 167
The district court held that the racial tiebreaker passed constitutional
muster under the strict-scrutiny standard of review. 168 A panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed. 169 The
panel ruled that the school district had compelling reasons for its racial
tiebreaker program: interests in student diversity and in avoiding racial

158

Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved I), 137 F.
Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
159
Id. at 1225-26.
160
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 713; see also Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
161
Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
162
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 723.
163
Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
164
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 712.
165
Parents Involved I, F. Supp. 2d at 1226 n.2; Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 712.
166
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 712 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167
Id. (“Seattle has never operated segregated schools—legally separate schools for students
of different races—nor has it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation.”).
168
Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
169
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved II), 377 F.3d
949, 980 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Its racial tiebreaker . . . plainly fails the narrow tailoring component of the
Constitution’s strict scrutiny test.”).
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isolation of its students. 170 The panel, however, found the tiebreaker was
not narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. 171 The Ninth Circuit
granted rehearing en banc and reversed the panel, specifically ruling that
the tiebreaker was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
interests. 172
In the second of the consolidated cases, McFarland v. Jefferson
County Public Schools, 173 Crystal Meredith, among other plaintiffs,
challenged Jefferson County Public Schools’ use of a race-conscious
student assignment program under the Equal Protection Clause after her
son, Joshua McDonald, was denied a transfer to his school of
preference. 174 The transfer was denied because it would have negatively
impacted racial balance. 175
The district’s voluntary race-conscious student-assignment plan
sought to increase black student enrollment at each of its non-magnet
elementary schools to “at least 15% and no more than 50%” of the
school’s student population. 176 While approximately thirty-four percent
of the district’s students were black, most of the remaining sixty-six
percent were white. 177 The district’s plan classified students into one of
two racial categories: black or other. 178
The Supreme Court later pointed out that while there was a history
of segregated schools in Jefferson County Public Schools, the district had
attained unitary status in 2000. 179 Despite attaining unitary status, the
district chose to implement the voluntary race-conscious plan so that the
benefits it gained while under a desegregation decree would not be
reversed. 180 The district court ruled that the school district had a
compelling interest in racial diversity that justified its race-conscious

170

Id. at 964.
Id. at 980.
172
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved III), 426 F.3d
1162, 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
173
McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. (McFarland I), 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky.
2004).
174
Id. at 836, 837 n.3; see also Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 717 (2007).
175
McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 837 n.3; see also Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 717.
176
McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (“This reflects a broad range equally above and
below Black student enrollment systemwide.”).
177
Id. at 840.
178
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 723; McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 840 n.6.
179
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 715-16 (noting the procedural history leading to the
district court’s finding that Jefferson County had attained unitary status). Unitary status is attained
when a district no longer runs a dual segregated school system. See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C.
Green, III, Charter Schools: Racial-Balancing Provisions and Parents Involved, 61 ARK. L. REV. 1,
15 (2008).
180
McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42.
171
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assignment plan. 181 Additionally, the district court ruled that the plan
was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest. 182 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 183
IV. GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE AND THE PARENTS INVOLVED
DECISION
This Part examines the Parents Involved decision for support to
characterize voluntary race-conscious student-assignment plans as
government speech. The Justices in Parents Involved 184 recognized the
legitimacy of some education policy goals or positions that could support
use of race-conscious measures. Accordingly, Parents Involved offers
support that race-conscious policies could be protected under the
government-speech doctrine.
By replacing the traditional Equal
Protection Clause framework, the government-speech doctrine would
eliminate the requirement that race-conscious programs be narrowly
tailored to the government’s compelling interest in diverse educational
settings. Without the narrow-tailoring requirement, the assignment plans
at issue in Parents Involved would have been found constitutional. 185
While the Justices analyzed the Parents Involved case under the
Equal Protection Clause, nuances of the government-speech doctrine can
be found in the Justices’ compelling-interest analysis. Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the Court, recognized two compelling policy goals
or positions for race-conscious assignment plans, interests that embody
government messages. 186 First is the remedial interest: if the government
has intentionally sent a message that some races are inferior or superior,
it can change its message through race-conscious measures designed to
correct the vestiges of that past intentional discrimination. 187 The Court
181

Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 717-18.
Id.
183
McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. (McFarland II), 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005).
184
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion, and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia
joined that opinion. Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 708. Justice Kennedy—the swing vote in
Parents Involved IV—concurred in the judgment and wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 782. Justice
Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, and Justice
Stevens wrote a brief dissent. Id. at 798, 803.
185
See infra notes 198, 200 and accompanying text.
186
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 720-22. The Court appeared to indicate that it is open to
adding other compelling interests in the future. See id. at 720 (“Without attempting in these cases to
set forth all the interests a school district might assert, it suffices to note that our prior cases, in
evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two interests that
qualify as compelling.” (emphasis added)).
187
Id. at 720 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)); see also id. at 793-96
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing remedial programs designed to remedy past intentional
discrimination).
182
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found that Jefferson County Public Schools did not act with a remedial
purpose, because the district had attained unitary status in 2000. 188 As
for Seattle School District No. 1, the Court concluded that since the
district had never officially sanctioned a message of racial
discrimination, its race-conscious plan was not remedial. 189 The Court
stated that, for both school districts, the “use of race must be justified on
some other basis” than remedial. 190
A second policy goal or position the Court recognized was diversity
in higher education. 191 The Court noted that an acceptable policy would
not focus solely on race; rather, diversity must include a broad range of
factors such as viewpoints, ideas, and culture that could add to student
diversity. 192 In fact, the Court noted that, in the past, it had tied its
approval of race-conscious measures designed to achieve diversity in
higher education to speech. 193 In essence, the Court itself has associated
race-conscious measures with speech. Justice Kennedy indicated, in his
concurrence, that diversity could be a compelling interest at the
elementary and secondary education levels as well. 194
Seattle and Jefferson County sought to convey through their plans
that their schools were not racially concentrated and that they favored
racial integration. 195 The Parents Involved plurality rejected the
districts’ focus on racial integration as justification for the plans. 196 The
districts also contended that they sought to provide students, through
their plans, the benefits of socializing with other races. 197 The plurality
rejected this message of socialization as justification for the plans, under
the narrow-tailoring requirement, because the plans were tied to racial
diversity rather the broader diversity referenced above. 198

188

Id. at 720-21.
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 720.
190
Id. at 721.
191
Id. at 722 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)).
192
Id. at 722-23, 726.
193
See id. at 724 (“In upholding the [race-conscious] admissions plan in Grutter, though, this
Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education, noting that in light of the
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
194
See id. at 791-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy wrote his concurring opinion
to discuss his disagreement with the plurality of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas, and the dissent authored by Justice Breyer. See id. at 782-83.
195
Id. at 725-26 (plurality opinion).
196
Id. at 726.
197
Id. at 725-26.
198
Id. at 726 (“[T]he racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored
to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.”).
189
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The districts sought to increase the visibility of minorities and
discourage racial isolation. 199 The plurality similarly rejected this policy
under its narrow-tailoring analysis because the messages relied on racial
diversity rather than broader diversity. 200 The plurality—Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito—indicated that
constitutionally permissible policies must regard people as individuals
rather than mere members of a racial group; in other words, the
government position or policy goal must further individuality rather than
racial group affiliation. 201 Further, the plurality admonished that race,
and its relevance to governmental decisionmaking, should be
deemphasized. 202
The plurality noted that while districts may design their plans to
remedy past intentional discrimination, 203 they cannot rely on the goal of
redressing past general societal discrimination. 204 The plurality reasoned
that societal discrimination is “too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy.” 205 Consequently, the plurality of Justices
ruled that remedying societal discrimination does not constitute a
compelling interest. 206 Moreover, they stated that a “governmental
agency’s interest in remedying societal discrimination, that is,
discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed
sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster.” 207
The plurality of Justices opined that even benign use of race is
costly and conveys an “odious” message to “a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” 208 According to
the plurality, voluntary race-conscious plans convey messages of “racial

199

Id. at 727-28.
Id. at 726.
201
Id. at 730 (“[T]he Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.”).
202
Id. at 730-31. The plurality reasoned that “[a]llowing racial balancing as a compelling end
in itself would effectively assure that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the
ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a
human being’s race will never be achieved.” Id. at 730 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
203
Id. at 720-21.
204
Id. at 731.
205
Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
206
Id. (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996)).
207
Id. at 731-32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
208
Id. at 745-46 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 214 (1995)).
200
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inferiority” and “racial hostility.” 209 Writing for the plurality, Chief
Justice Roberts stated that such plans send a message to citizens that their
government “demeans the dignity and worth of a person.” 210
Additionally, the plurality opined that the plans “reinforce the belief,
held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be
judged by the color of their skin.” 211
Unfortunately, the plurality attached no constitutional difference to
the messages sent through invidious and benign uses of race. 212 In other
words, it makes no difference whether a race-conscious plan promotes
racial integration or racial resegregation, racial hostility or race harmony,
racial isolation or avoidance of racial isolation, visibility of minorities or
invisibility of minorities, racial inclusion or racial exclusion; the plurality
rejects these messages simply because they are race-conscious. It is
likely from the plurality opinion that Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and
Chief Justice Roberts would not be amenable to reviewing raceconscious student-assignment plans under the government-speech
doctrine, particularly because of the broad immunity the doctrine affords
government speech. Given their aversion to benign and invidious raceconscious plans alike, if these Justices choose to review race-conscious
measures under the government-speech doctrine, they could opt to carve
out an exception to the doctrine for race-conscious measures. Under
such a scenario, the Justices would concede that voluntary raceconscious measures constitute government speech, while nonetheless
holding that, unlike all other forms of government speech, raceconscious measures are not entitled to the broad immunity of the
doctrine.
Justice Thomas, who wrote a separate concurrence, went even
further than his plurality brethren. While the plurality would support
race-conscious measures that satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirements
discussed above, Justice Thomas made clear his general view that all
government uses of race are unconstitutional. 213 Like the other Justices
in the plurality, Justice Thomas stated that school districts can use raceconscious measures to correct past intentional discrimination but not

209

Id. at 746 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
210
Id.
211
Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)).
212
Id. at 740-48.
213
Id. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A]s a general rule, all race-based government
decisionmaking—regardless of context—is unconstitutional.”); see also id. at 751 (“The
Constitution does not permit race-based government decisionmaking simply because a school
district claims a remedial purpose and proceeds in good faith with arguably pure motives.”).
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racial imbalance in schools. 214 Even then, unlike his plurality brethren,
he believes that such acceptable remediation is “a one-time process
involving the redress of a discrete legal injury inflicted by an identified
entity.” 215 According to Justice Thomas, “the further we get from the era
of state-sponsored racial separation, the less likely it is that racial
imbalance has a traceable connection to any prior segregation.” 216 He
rejected the Seattle and Jefferson County plans as failing to serve
acceptable race-based compelling interests because they lacked a
“cognizable interest in remediation.” 217
Justice Thomas stated that race-conscious plans send a demeaning
message: “every time the government places citizens on racial registers
and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it
demeans us all.” 218 In other words, he believes that benign and invidious
race-conscious plans alike send demeaning messages. Perhaps signaling
where Justice Thomas would stand with respect to government speech
and race-conscious measures, he declared that “[a]ssertions of general
societal discrimination are plainly insufficient.” 219 In Justice Thomas’s
view, voluntary race-conscious plans convey a message of “racial
paternalism” with effects that are “poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination.” 220 Justice Thomas also rejected race-conscious
government actions designed to unite the races. 221 He believes such
actions create “resentment,” “racial tension,” and “pit[] the races against
one another.” 222
Based on his fervent opposition to race-conscious measures, it is
unlikely that Justice Thomas would accept the government-speech
doctrine’s principle of judicial deference to school-board speech. 223 For
instance, in opposing deference in Parents Involved, he essentially
argued that the Court cannot approve school use of race-conscious

214

Id. at 755-56.
Id. at 756 (emphasis added).
216
Id. (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
118 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
217
Id. at 757.
218
Id. at 752 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
219
Id. at 755 (emphasis added) (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
499, 504 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978)).
220
Id. at 759 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 766 (“To adopt the dissent’s deferential approach [to the school districts] would be to
abdicate our constitutional responsibilities.”).
215
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measures to create a more inclusive America. 224 Justice Thomas also
rejected the message of pluralism as justification for the race-conscious
plans. 225
The race-based government speech of “socialization and good
citizenship” would not be sufficient for Justice Thomas to uphold racebased plans. 226 Neither would an educational message that promotes
“the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary
to make a land of 300 million people one Nation” satisfy Justice
Thomas. 227 He dismissed these “lessons” as “sweeping,” “generic,” and
“not uniquely relevant to schools or uniquely teachable in a formal
educational setting.” 228
Justice Thomas, given his parameters for race-conscious studentassignment plans that would serve a compelling interest, would likely
oppose a move to government-speech jurisprudence for race-conscious
plans:
[T]he school boards cannot plausibly maintain that their plans further
a compelling interest. . . . [O]nly those measures the State must take
to provide a bulwark against anarchy . . . or to prevent violence and a
government’s effort to remedy past discrimination for which it is
responsible constitute compelling interests. Neither of the parties has
argued—nor could they—that race-based student assignment is
necessary to provide a bulwark against anarchy or to prevent
violence. 229

Justice Thomas’s opposition comes from his belief in and advocacy of a
colorblind Constitution. 230 In fact, he stated that he is “quite comfortable
in the company” of those who espouse that the United States
Constitution is blind to the color of the nation’s citizens. 231
Justice Kennedy—a critical and likely swing vote on future raceconscious student-assignment plans 232 —has given some indication of
where he might stand on race-conscious government-speech

224

Id. at 766 n.14.
Id. at 766.
226
Id. at 767-68.
227
Id. at 767 (criticizing this “democratic interest” as “limitless in scope”).
228
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
229
Id. at 771 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
230
Id. at 772.
231
Id.
232
See generally Preston Green, III, Bruce D. Baker & Joseph O. Oluwole, Achieving Racial
Equal Educational Opportunity Through School Finance Litigation, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283
(2008); Oluwole & Green, supra note 179.
225
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jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy began his Parents Involved concurrence
by acknowledging and lauding the message of racial unity that the
districts sought to convey through their race-conscious plans:
[S]chools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of
different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the
freedom of all. In these cases two school districts in different parts of
the country seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that
reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding community. That the
school districts consider these plans to be necessary should remind us
our highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled. 233

He expressed concern, however, that the districts’ race-conscious plans
might communicate and indeed “entrench the very prejudices we seek to
overcome.” 234 In essence, Justice Kennedy considered speech crucial to
the analysis of race-conscious plans. 235
Justice Kennedy expressed anxiety that official racial labeling could
be a threat to individuality. 236 Labeling is, of course, a form of speech.
Justice Kennedy’s concern arose from the fact that labeling
communicates a message that is “inconsistent with the dignity of
individuals in our society.” 237 Further, he observed that a racial label is
“a label that an individual is powerless to change.” 238
Justice Kennedy rejects messages of racial inferiority, calling such
messages illegitimate. 239 He approves a message of equal opportunity,
which he characterizes as “legitimate.” 240 He also made it clear that he
rejects the message of racial isolation, noting that “[t]o the extent the
plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in
schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.” 241 According to him,
school districts may properly attempt to correct racial isolation as well as

233

Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
234
Id.
235
The speech here is a prejudicial message that could come from racial grouping/labeling.
Justice Kennedy warned that such speech should be cautiously managed lest it communicate
divisiveness. Id. at 797. He also expressed fears that such speech could communicate to students
that they are stigmatized. Id. at 798.
236
Id. at 797.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 783 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
240
Id. at 787-88.
241
Id. at 788.
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“de facto resegregation in schooling.” 242 He stated that there is a
compelling interest in avoiding isolation, an interest that districts are free
to pursue. 243
Despite his concerns regarding racial labeling, Justice Kennedy
declared that school districts can pursue diversity as a compelling
interest. 244 He accepts a school district’s efforts to achieve diversity
when race is one of the components of the definition. 245 He is evidently
open to benign race-conscious plans that explain when and how race will
be used, and clearly identify who will make the race-based decisions. 246
He also requires that school districts provide a “convincing explanation”
for their plans’ designs. 247
Justice Kennedy cautioned that when the message is racial
integration, “ambiguities become all the more problematic in light of the
contradictions and confusions that result.” 248 In other words, it is likely
that a more precisely defined race-conscious plan could meet Justice
Kennedy’s approval. 249 He requires that districts’ plans “first define
what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is
nonwhite?” 250 The Jefferson County and Seattle plans did not include
this information and Justice Kennedy found that the language used to
describe the plans was imprecise. 251
Justice Kennedy indicated that, while he supports elementary and
secondary schools’ use of race-conscious plans to achieve diversity,
schools must not sacrifice student individuality. 252 He stated that:
If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions
of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal
educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise
race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and

242

Id. See Carter, supra note 6, at 21 (characterizing de facto segregation as expression).
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
244
Id. at 783; see also id. at 798 (“[N]eighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the
diversity of our Nation as a whole.”).
245
Id. at 788, 798 (“Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic
factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.”).
246
See id. at 783-85.
247
Id. at 787.
248
Id. at 785 (emphasis added).
249
Id. at 785-87.
250
Id. at 797.
251
See id. at 786-87 (using language such as “fails to make clear,” “failed to explain why,”
and “does not explain how”).
252
See id. at 787-90.
243
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without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of
a systematic, individual typing by race. 253

Under a government-speech analysis, Justice Kennedy would likely
allow districts to use race-conscious measures to communicate their
message of “bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and
races” through such measures as
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race. 254

Justice Kennedy favors these measures because he believes that,
while they are race-conscious, they do not sacrifice student
individuality. 255 He stated that these measures are not “based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race.” 256
In essence, Justice Kennedy cautioned against measures telling
individual students that their primary or only identity is race. With
respect to these race-conscious measures, he opined:
Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have
considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted
to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional
violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the
impact a given approach might have on students of different races. 257

Justice Kennedy concluded that school districts should not view the
Court’s decision as preventing their efforts to bring students of diverse
racial background together. 258 In other words, Justice Kennedy does not
want to disempower school districts. Indeed, one could conclude from
the above discussion that Justice Kennedy would approve race-conscious
measures promoting such messages as diversity, equal education
opportunity and racial unity, as long as those measures do not also

253

Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 789 (revealing that, under Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy
would not apply strict scrutiny to such race-conscious measures). Justice Thomas’s preference for
the colorblind Constitution strongly indicates that he would reject these measures. See supra notes
230-231 and accompanying text.
255
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 789.
256
Id. (emphasis added).
257
Id.
258
Id. at 798.
254
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convey messages of racial hostility by individually typing students by
race.
In the dissent, Justice Breyer made it clear that the dissenting
Justices would approve race-conscious measures. 259 According to
Justice Breyer, the message of the race-conscious plans of Jefferson
County Public Schools and Seattle School District No. 1 was “racially
integrated education . . . long ago promised—efforts that this Court has
repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to
undertake.” 260 He stated that the Constitution authorizes local school
districts to choose race-conscious measures to convey this message. 261
Recall that the immunity provided to the government by the
government-speech doctrine implies judicial deference to the
government when it speaks. 262 In essence, the government-speech
doctrine embraces local decisionmaking. Justice Breyer emphasized this
rationale in this opinion. For example, he pointed out that “the Court left
much of the determination of how to achieve integration to the judgment
of local communities.” 263 Further, he highlighted the fact that the Brown
Court had ruled that:
259

See generally id. at 803-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Stevens, and
Souter, JJ.). Of course, the dissenting Justices support race-conscious plans conveying remedial
messages. See id. at 818-20, 838 (“[T]here is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting
right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation.”). While Justice Stevens agreed with
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, he wrote a separate dissenting opinion to emphasize his belief
that race-conscious measures that communicate the inclusion of racial minorities, particularly in
schools, should not be prohibited. Id. at 798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260
Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 805-06.
261
Id. at 803-04, 823; see also id. at 821 (“A court finding of de jure segregation cannot be
the crucial variable.”). Justice Breyer also declared:
Louisville’s history makes clear that a community under a court order to desegregate might
submit a race-conscious remedial plan before the court dissolved the order, but with every
intention of following that plan even after dissolution. How could such a plan be lawful the
day before dissolution but then become unlawful the very next day? On what legal ground
can the majority rest its contrary view?
Are courts really to treat as merely de facto segregated those school districts that avoided a
federal order by voluntarily complying with Brown’s requirements? This Court has
previously done just the opposite, permitting a race-conscious remedy without any kind of
court decree. Because the Constitution emphatically does not forbid the use of raceconscious measures by districts in the South that voluntarily desegregated their schools, on
what basis does the plurality claim that the law forbids Seattle to do the same?
Id. at 821-22 (citations omitted).
262
See Gey, supra note 111, at 1262. (“Government speech claims always arise in the context
of First Amendment disputes with private speakers, and in these cases the private speakers lose their
First Amendment claim not because the Court views the private speakers’ expressive claims as
weak, but rather because the Court views the government’s competing expressive interests as
stronger.”); Blocher, supra note 18, at 697, 711; Cambron-McCabe, supra note 119, at 754, 773.
263
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 804 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (referring to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude,
for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do
this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers
of school authorities. 264

This quote also reveals that Justice Breyer and his dissenting
colleagues endorse race-conscious measures aimed at pluralism. This
pluralism policy includes an “interest in producing an educational
environment that reflects the pluralistic society in which our children will
live.” 265 It also aligns with other laudable goals the dissenting Justices
support: the racial harmony and cooperation evident in children of all
races playing and working together. 266
Expounding on the local control rationale, Justice Breyer observed
that the “complexity” and “practical difficulties” 267 of achieving racially
integrated schools justify giving school districts flexibility to implement
race-conscious plans. 268 He opined that evidence in favor of an
educational interest in racially integrated schools is so strong that it
provides a reasonable basis to find the interest compelling. 269
Justice Breyer expressed his approval of racial balancing as he
advocated for deference to local officials in pursuing such plans. 270
Specifically, he noted that the Supreme Court has ruled that schools
“have wide discretion in formulating school policy, and . . . as a matter of
educational policy school authorities may well conclude that some kind
of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any
constitutional requirements.” 271
This language indicates that the
dissenting Justices would support school districts that choose, under the
government-speech doctrine, to favor racial balancing policies over race
neutral policies.

264

Id. at 804-05 (emphasis added) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
265
Id. at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 16).
266
See id. at 841.
267
Id. at 822.
268
See id.
269
Id. at 839.
270
Id. at 823-24.
271
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting N.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45
(1971)); see also id. at 824 (“These statements nowhere suggest that this freedom is limited to school
districts where court-ordered desegregation measures are also in effect.”).
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The dissenting Justices endorsed fostering unity among the races. 272
They rejected Justice Thomas’s “colorblind” message, while
emphasizing that messages designed to discriminate against minorities
should not be equated, in constitutional terms, with messages designed to
include them. 273
Recall that a rationale for the government-speech doctrine is that
citizens may hold the government accountable for its speech at the ballot
box. 274 In Parents Involved, the dissent emphasized a similar rationale
for their support of the voluntary race conscious plans of Jefferson
County and Seattle School District No. 1:
[A] judge would also be aware that a legislature or school
administrators, ultimately accountable to the electorate, could
nonetheless properly conclude that a racial classification sometimes
serves a purpose important enough to overcome the risks they
mention, for example, helping to end racial isolation or to achieve a
diverse student body in public schools. 275

Justice Breyer found the Jefferson County and Seattle School
District plans acceptable because they did not seek to “pit the races
against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate racial
tensions.” 276 The districts had an acceptable message: the voluntary
race-conscious plans were designed to foster racial unity rather than
racial isolation. 277 Other forms of acceptable speech Justice Breyer
recognized were the promotion of less racial prejudice and “interracial
sociability and friendship.” 278
He reasoned that “[p]rimary and
secondary schools are where the education of this Nation’s children

272

See id. at 829.
Id. at 830. Justice Breyer, writing for the dissenting Justices, reasoned that “[t]he
constitutional principle enunciated in Swann, reiterated in subsequent cases, and relied upon over
many years, provides, and has widely been thought to provide, authoritative legal guidance. And if
the plurality now chooses to reject that principle . . . it must explain to the courts and to the Nation
why it would abandon guidance set forth many years before, guidance that countless others have
built upon over time, and which the law has continuously embodied.” Id. at 831 (citation omitted).
274
See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)
(“When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular
idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.”).
275
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 836-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
276
Id. at 835.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 841.
273
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begins, where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us
to the end of our days.” 279
It is evident from the above discussion of the Parents Involved
dissent that there is support on the Court for deference to school districts
when it comes to benign use of race. Clearly, a faction of the Court does
not support the plurality’s redlining of benign voluntary race-conscious
plans. 280 Consequently, a school district’s advocacy for diversity, racial
harmony, pluralism, interracial sociability through race-conscious
policies might survive. Advocates for diversity, racial unity, pluralism,
racial integration and racial inclusion in elementary and secondary
education must not give up the fight now. For we know that “unless our
children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will
ever learn to live together.” 281 If schools are allowed to implement raceconscious plans conveying the various messages above, the nation will
hopefully progress into an era when there may no longer be a need for
race-conscious measures.
279

Id. at 842; see also id. at 843 (“The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an
effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general societal discrimination, but of primary and secondary
school segregation; it includes an effort to create school environments that provide better educational
opportunities for all children; it includes an effort to help create citizens better prepared to know, to
understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of
democratic government our Constitution foresees. If an educational interest that combines these
three elements is not compelling, what is?” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
280
While Justices Stevens and Souter have retired from the Court, Justices Kagan and
Sotomayor—two Justices nominated by the Obama administration to replace Stevens and Souter
respectively—are likely to continue the support for race-conscious measures. See, e.g., Calhoun v.
U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1136 (2013) (setting forth Justice Sotomayor’s strongly-worded statements against
racial prejudice); Richard L. Hasen, End Of The Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme
Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 242-251 (2013) (describing political polarization of
the Supreme Court); Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty The Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative
Action Cases? Fisher v. University Of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77, 78, 85 & n.39 (2012) (noting that Justice Kagan recused herself from
the case and suggesting that with respect to the Fisher case, which regards race-based affirmative
action in higher education, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer would vote together while
Justices Thomas, Scalia, Roberts and Alito would vote together). See also id. at 85 n.39 (“Justice
Sotomayor has yet to vote in a conventional race-based affirmative action case at the Court.”).
Further, during a 2001 speech, Justice Sotomayor spoke about the impact of a judge’s race on his or
her judicial decisions: “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”
Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2009),
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html. See Kenneth Duvall, The Defendant Was Not
Heard . . . Now What?: Prejudice Analysis, Harmless Error Review, And the Right to Testify, 35
HAMLINE L. REV. 279, 320 (2012) (noting that “Justice Kagan often votes with Justice Sotomayorthey voted together more often last term than any other Supreme Court pairing save Justices Roberts
and Alito”).
281
Id. at 842 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)); see also id. at 868 (“The last half century has witnessed great strides toward racial
equality, but we have not yet realized the promise of Brown. To invalidate the plans under review is
to threaten the promise of Brown. The plurality’s position, I fear, would break that promise.”).
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CONCLUSION
It is evident from Parents Involved that at least five of the Justices
found merit in the pursuit of diversity through voluntary race-conscious
student assignment plans. 282 Also evident is that Justice Kennedy does
not support race-conscious plans that are not narrowly tailored. 283 As
mentioned above, the narrow tailoring requirement in Equal Protection
analysis is the death knell of benign voluntary race-conscious
measures. 284 Given the apparently insurmountable nature of that
requirement, the government-speech doctrine may provide a needed
opening for school districts that seek to promote diversity and racial
integration. Given that “such messages regarding the continued salience
of race are both generated by and subject to correction through the
political process, government-speech principles counsel against allowing
individuals to transform their disagreements with those messages into
constitutional claims.” 285
As Professor Carter points out, “[r]ace consciousness itself has
become a constitutional harm, regardless of its tangible effects.” 286 A
government-speech jurisprudence might help us reverse this. Benign
voluntary race-conscious plans would likely meet the Johanns index of
control noted above, 287 as the plans are “effectively controlled” 288 by the
local school boards. Schools can ensure that their plans meet the
Johanns index of control by establishing the overarching message the
plans convey and by retaining final approval authority over all aspects of
the plans.
The government-speech jurisprudence would not require that school
districts be viewpoint-neutral or content-neutral with respect to benign
race-conscious plans. Besides, as Professor Carter observes, the
judiciary should not dictate to or second-guess a majority-white
community that decides it is willing to “disadvantage itself for what it
sees as a greater social good.” 289

282

Id. at 865.
Id. at 784-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
284
See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
285
Carter, supra note 6, at 43.
286
Id. at 2.
287
See supra note 67.
288
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005).
289
Carter, supra note 6, at 55 (“When a numerical and electoral majority that has not faced a
history of subordination or stigmatization has freely chosen to disadvantage itself for what it sees as
a greater social good, that majority is able to remedy its situation through the ballot box. There
would presumably be no need for a judicial check on the majoritarian process because the selfdisadvantaging group is the majority.”).
283
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We must not confuse government speech that seeks to segregate
races from speech that seeks to include minorities in our nation’s future.
Invidious and pernicious race-conscious measures must remain subject to
strict scrutiny even while benign voluntary race-conscious measures
move to review under government-speech doctrine. This is critical
because segregation policies were not only repugnant for defining
minorities as inferior, “they perpetuated a caste system rooted in the
institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination.” 290
Those who oppose the benign use of race should remember that
“[t]he lesson of history is not that efforts to continue racial segregation
are constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to achieve racial
integration.” 291 To pretend that benign and invidious race-conscious
plans are the same is wrong; for it is “a cruel distortion of history to
compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950’s to Louisville and Seattle in the
modern day—to equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to
attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald
(whose request to transfer to a school closer to home was initially
declined).” 292
We must keep in mind that “judges are not well suited to act as
school administrators.” 293 Consequently, prudence cautions against
judges dictating solutions that override local efforts to address
resegregation. Unlike non-elected federal judges, school boards are
accountable to their communities:
[A] school board is elected by the public, and until its current
members are voted out of office, they “speak” for the school district
through the policies they adopt. Furthermore, in the case of the typical
school board, influence from the community does not end at the ballot
box, but continues through publicly-held school board meetings at
which parents and other interested parties may express satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the school board’s policies or “speech.” 294

We must empower districts to use the tool of race-conscious
programs that some districts now consider critical. 295 By continuing to

290

Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 867 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id.
292
Id.
293
Id. at 848-49.
294
Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000).
295
Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 862 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 866 (“And
what of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards? For several
decades this Court has rested its public school decisions upon Swann’s basic view that the
Constitution grants local school districts a significant degree of leeway where the inclusive use of
291
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apply the Equal Protection Clause strict-scrutiny analysis to benign raceconscious measures, we obstruct schools from promoting the compelling
ideals of diversity and racial inclusion. If we continue on this path,
advocates of race-conscious measures and our entire country should
“fear the consequences of doing so for the law, for the schools, for the
democratic process, and for America’s efforts to create, out of its
diversity, one Nation.” 296
In order not to undermine the efforts and messages of local school
districts, benign voluntary race-conscious measures should be viewed as
government speech. Under this approach, the electorate will be able to
hold the government accountable, while districts will retain the flexibility
and creativity to implement policies of pluralism, racial integration, and
racial harmony. In so doing, we will equip students to deal with our
pluralistic society and sustain the core values of our democracy. History
has put us on notice that “the fate of race relations in this country
depends upon unity among our children, for unless our children begin to
learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live
together.” 297 It is up to us—We the People—to “debate how best to
educate the Nation’s children and how best to administer America’s
schools to achieve that aim.” 298

race-conscious criteria is at issue. Now localities will have to cope with the difficult problems they
face (including resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary.”).
296
Id. at 863.
297
Id. at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
298
Id. at 862.
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